A discussion of the differences between Moscow and Peking over the question of domestic revolutionary strategy, i.e., the "transition to Communism." These differences arise over such issues as the question of timing, the communes, fundamentalism vs. pragmatism, experimentation vs. consolidation, and the applicability of the Soviet model for underdeveloped areas. Some of the causes of these differences are suggested: differing national circumstances, Maoist evangelism, and differing revolutionary histories. The implications of these differences for the world Communist movement are also examined.
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