A discussion of the reasons for Khrushchev's open attack on the Albanian Party leadership (and, indirectly, on the Chinese Communist leadership as well) at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. The significance of this renewed pressure on Peking and its likely consequences are also examined. The possibility existed that Khrushchev's attack on Albania would lead to a public break with China, thus bringing into the open a conflict that had become increasingly intense.
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