An analysis of Soviet Bloc pricing practices showing the possible existence of multilateral and mutual discrimination among the Bloc countries. While the Soviet Union may offer less favorable trade terms to her satellites than to Free Europe, Bloc countries also offer less favorable trade terms to the Soviet Union and the other satellites than to Free Europe. In other words, the Soviet Union has created captive partners in a fenced-in area. Once political captives of the Soviet Union, the members are captives of each other in the net of economic dependencies as well. Together with the captor state, they appear to inflict on each other trade conditions that are disadvantageous by their own standards of fairness.
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