An assessment of Khrushchev's present political power as a limited dictatorship and of the four major sources of limits on his power. The nature of the Soviet political system compels Khrushchev to justify his policies before the Central Committee and the Party Congress. From the character of his political and economic reforms, he must take account of the attitudes and desires of the administrative and professional classes. Khrushchev lacks not only the prestige of achievement that made Lenin the universally recognized leader, but also the popular authority that Stalin won as the architect of victory in Russia's war against Germany. Khrushchev can not and perhaps will not deter opposition by his subordinates by the imminent threat of terrible sanctions.
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