A discussion of the nonmilitary measures taken in countering insurgencies in the Philippines and Malaya. Large-scale, structural, social reform seems to have been less important in bringing insurgency under control than is often assumed. However, what was successfully accomplished in both countries and perhaps contributed more to the control of insurgency was the re-establishment of the authority of the government. This was achieved by implementing firm policies and also by reawakening the people's confidence and hope through convincing evidence that the government did care about their welfare. In one case this was done by the national government through Magsaysay; in the other case, by the colonial government through Briggs and Templer.
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