The British Effort to Secure an Independent Deterrent 1952-1962.
Expert InsightsPublished 1963
An examination of Britain's effort, during 1952-1962, to secure an independent deterrent. The British faced a losing struggle against the rapid obsolescence and spiraling costs of first-line military equipment, the mounting requirements for penetrating the air defenses of a great power with certainty, and the difficulty of maintaining a secure strike-second force in the face of a great power threat. The British experience is seen as an illustration of the disabilities of a medium-rank power within an alliance attempting to create a credible deterrent against a great power. 21 pp.
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1963
- Pages: 21
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: P-2692
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