An examination of the Conventional War in Europe (CWE) philosophy of the present administration. The emphasis on conventional capabilities is criticized mainly insofar as it (1) implies a need for European-based forces appreciably greater than or different from those now promised, (2) is presented as the main justification for a policy which combines pressure for fulfillment of existing commitments with sharp opposition to the independent nuclear aspirations of our major allies, or (3) affects such crucial questions as whether we now have the means to satisfactorily defend Berlin. 33 pp.
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