Guerrilla-Combat, Strategy and Deterrence in Southeast Asia

George C. Reinhardt

ResearchPublished 1964

A discussion of U.S. political and military, in Southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam. Various historical parallels with present A discussion of U.S. policy, political and military, in Southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam. Various historical parallels with present actions and attitudes are drawn. Several degrees of limited war are discussed, with the implications of their possible escalation. U.S. regional objectives must depend on integration of military, political, economic, and ideological long-range plans for the deterrence or defeat of Communism in Southeast Asia.

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  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 1964
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 27
  • Paperback Price: $20.00
  • Document Number: P-2706-1

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RAND Style Manual
Reinhardt, George C., Guerrilla-Combat, Strategy and Deterrence in Southeast Asia, RAND Corporation, P-2706-1, 1964. As of September 11, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P2706-1.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Reinhardt, George C., Guerrilla-Combat, Strategy and Deterrence in Southeast Asia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1964. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P2706-1.html. Also available in print form.
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