A discussion of the usefulness of game theory for military analysis. The prevailing pessimism is premature and subject to reexamination. The advantages of a game-theoretic analysis are large. They include the possibility of dealing with a wide spectrum of strategic possibilities, the explicit inclusion of the basic two- or many-sidedness of military conflicts, and the opportunity for optimization. However, since game-theoretic analysis cannot be expected to deal with the staggering complexity of large-scale military engagements, progress will long be made primarily with highly simplified models. As a result, game-theoretic studies will need supplemental "unpacking" and "testing." Imbedding abstract games in a family of models whose aggregated solutions are refined and evaluated by more detailed simulation appears to be one promising direction.
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