Over the past few years, the primacy of strategic missile forces has become a tenet of Soviet military doctrine. It would now appear, judging from recently published Soviet military discussions, that a countertrend has begun--representing a reaction in some quarters against the new orthodoxy embodying such Khrushchevian strategic notions as the absolute primacy of nuclear missile weapons. In part, this reaction may represent merely a continuation of the modernist-traditionalist debate. Some military writers from both schools have now begun to suggest, however, that such ideas have been carried too far, threatening to create a new orthodoxy that could cripple the creative development of Soviet military theory and of other forces, particularly aviation.
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