A Note on Stability of Outcomes with Vote Trading.
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It has been asserted that there is ordinarily a stable equilibrium outcome to a vote trading situation with many decisions and many voters. Based on certain assumptions, two theorems are proved that cast doubt on the validity of that assertion: (1) For an outcome to be stable with vote trading it must be identical with the outcome without vote trading. (2) If vote trading is "beneficial" in the sense that some majority set can improve the payoffs to all of its members over those without vote trading, there is no stable outcome with vote trading. 8 pp. Ref.
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