Soviet Military Policy Trends Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin Regime.
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A review of Soviet military trends since October 1964 when Khrushchev was removed from power. There has been no radical change of direction in Soviet defense preparations or in the strategic philosophy underlying them. Among the major issues of Brezhnev-Kosygin regime is that of defense claims on Soviet resources--a perennial question sharpened by the new regime's commitment to domestic economic reform and improvement. Indications are that the present Soviet leadership considers a major war between the United States and the USSR as unlikely; war as an instrument of policy in the nuclear age is one of the main issues in Sino-Soviet differences. Soviet leaders also seem to be considering the strategic balance and the issue of military superiority via the arms control route rather than relying solely on further unilateral buildup of offensive and defensive strategic forces. Despite the demands of the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's increasing stake in Asian affairs, priority is given to maintaining the USSR/European power position in dealing with the political and military problems of Europe--in particular, that of keeping a resurgent Germany in check. 29 pp.
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