Communist China's Military Policies and Nuclear Strategy.

by Alice Langley Hsieh

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A statement before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, November 7, 1967. Far from conforming with its warlike public image, China's external military policies have been characterized by a considerable degree of caution. The Chinese seem likely to make a low-risk use of their nuclear delivery capability along politico-military and propaganda lines with a view toward enhancing China's international political stature, imposing restraints on U.S. policies in Asia, and fostering internal instability and national liberation movements in the region. A theater capability would enable the Chinese to claim that the U.S. nuclear deterrent was neutralized and that China's superior conventional forces tilted the regional balance of power in China's favor. In any event, the intent would be to exploit Asian anxiety about U.S. bases, to pressure the United States to avoid a confrontation with China, and to persuade the United States to seek some rapprochement with China, if necessary, on Chinese terms. 20 pp.

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