A proposed formal system, similar to predicate calculus, for relating meanings to sentences in real languages. The system allows for paraphrase--for different sentences representing the same meaning--as is not done by present interpretive theories of semantics. The language of semantic representation cannot be a logic, since it must be based on the culture and structure of natural language and hence must include notions that are not acceptable in any logic. Self-predicability must be permitted, because a word such as "short" is itself a short word. Referents need not be real; hearers seem to interpret similarly references to real and to unreal things. (Prepared for inclusion in [Recent Developments in Linguistics]; expanded from a version presented at the 10th International Congress of Linguists, Bucharest, 1967.) 31 pp.
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