n-Person Game Theory

by Lloyd S. Shapley

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A brief discussion of the current trends of research into the theory of n-person games. An n-person game is defined, along with several key concepts of the theory, such as the Pareto set, the core, the value, stable sets, bargaining sets, and competitive equilibrium. The economic examples given specifically involve the concept of ownership of a productive resource in a multiperson interactive context. This is the text of a talk presented at a combined meeting of the RAND Air Force Advisory Group and the RAND Board of Trustees on November 9, 1967.

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