Evolution of Soviet Military Policy.

Thomas W. Wolfe

Expert InsightsPublished 1968

An analysis of Soviet military policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Soviet efforts in the strategic field have been directed toward buildup of the strategic delivery forces and the strengthening of strategic defenses, including the initiation of ABM deployment. The regime also has attempted to improve the mobility of Soviet conventional or general-purpose forces, a process which has involved transforming the Soviet navy from its traditional role of a mere adjunct to Soviet land power into an instrument for global support of Soviet interests. Political-military relations, an area of recurrent tension during the 50 years of Soviet history, have taken on a new significance in view of the special problems created by the nuclear age. These problems fall into three categories: (1) maintaining political control over the armed forces in time of crisis; (2) meshing industrial-military planning; and (3) balancing military influence on Soviet policy formulation against the need of political authorities to rely increasingly on the professional expertise of the military leadership. 40 pp.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1968
  • Pages: 40
  • Document Number: P-3773

Citation

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Wolfe, Thomas W., Evolution of Soviet Military Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1968. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3773.html.
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