Comments, in the form of a letter to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, on the AEC proposal to restrict access to "extremely sensitive" technical and scientific data developed independently of the government. The AEC bases its proposal on the premise that gas centrifuge technology offers great potential for clandestine operation of small enrichment plants and therefore poses a serious challenge to the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. It is the author's view that the proposed rules are a potential danger to the freedom of scientists and engineers who are not associated with the government to communicate their findings to others. By sharply narrowing access to privately developed information in certain technical areas judged sensitive by the Commission, the rules would make it more difficult to evaluate or oppose government decisions. 14 pp.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.