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An explanation of why and how defense intellectuals, especially but not exclusively economists, have significantly influenced U.S. military policy in recent years; how this influence has been consolidated by important changes in the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense; and why these bureaucratic changes are predicted to survive, despite Secretary McNamara's departure. The combination of (1) simple but pervasive concepts derived from maximization theories, (2) painstaking examination and design of relevant alternatives in systems analyses, and (3) alternatives so structured within our bureaucracy has yielded policy power. (This Paper was prepared for presentation before appropriate groups in Australia and Japan.) 37 pp.

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