Download
Download Free Electronic Document
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.2 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add to Cart | Paperback7 pages | $20.00 | $16.00 20% Web Discount |
This review of Can We Win in Vietnam? by Frank Armbruster, Raymond Gastil, Herman Kahn, William Pfaff, and Edmund Stillman, praises the book's "adversarial format," in which the views of the writers are presented separately, in roundtable discussion, and are comparatively analyzed by Kahn. Armbruster, Gastil, and Kahn consider themselves in substantial agreement with the Administration, yet they propose radical changes in our Vietnam policy. That these measures underrate Viet Cong strengths and the political aspects of the struggle in general is not their worst fault. The assertions with which they are proposed (there is much "room for improvement" in Vietnam and the "possibilities" for improvement are "great") ignore the failures of the past 7 years and are inadequate for a policy discussion of today. What must be told the President is not that "we may yet win," but the odds (on adoption of policies, implementation, VC and GVN counters, effectiveness), the costs, the time required, and the risks. Only Stillman and Pfaff seriously address themselves to the "we" in the title question and give needed consideration to American limitations.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.