The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential.

Francis James West

Expert InsightsPublished 1969

Consideration of the strike team concept as used in Vietnam and in the context of force structure doctrine. The means of mobility, communications, and firepower at the disposal of American forces in Vietnam represent major technological breakthroughs in the tools of warfare. They have been used mainly to expedite tactical maneuvers, but they also warrant revisions in organizational structure and unit missions. The performance of the strike teams in Vietnam over the last three years gives increasing evidence that, for certain tasks, a set of small units is more effective than one large unit. Strike teams are small units who move covertly in enemy territory, launch a surprise attack, and withdraw suddenly. They have achieved enemy attrition at less cost in manpower. But this is not their potential merit, since attrition is not a valid or obtainable war objective. To maximize their relative advantage over larger units, they should also perform harassment and surveillance. Strike teams should be incorporated into an overall strategy to buy time while South Vietnamese forces are being reshaped and an area security system is being established.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

West, Francis James, The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1969. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3987.html.
BibTeX RIS

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.