Policymaking in the Soviet Union : A Statement with Supplementary Comments.

by Thomas W. Wolfe

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An analysis of Soviet military policy priorities presented at hearings of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 23, 1969. Important Soviet policy decisions under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime probably have tended to represent a "committee compromise" among contending preferences and factions within the ruling oligarchy. Main problems have fallen into three categories: (1) maintaining political control over armed forces in times of crisis and amidst the hazards of a nuclear-missile world; (2) coordinating economic and military planning to cope with the resource-consuming appetite of modern weapon systems; and (3) balancing military influence on Soviet policy formulation against the need of political authorities to call upon the professional expertise of the military leadership. In addition, there appears to be a growing concern over allocating available resources more effectively toward national economic-growth projects. 25 pp.

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