Congestion Tolls for Regulated Common Carriers.

by Rolla Edward Park

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback23 pages $20.00 $16.00 20% Web Discount

Discussion of the role of congestion tolls to increase the efficiency of use of commercial airports, in terms of a simple model of air transportation. In contrast to previous discussions, users and producers of transportation service (passengers and airlines) are explicitly distinguished. In the first version of the model, ticket prices are assumed--unrealistically--to be flexible and competitively determined; then perfect optimality is attainable by imposing an appropriate toll either on airlines or on passengers. In the more realistic second version of the model, ticket price is fixed above the competitive level. In the absence of toll, there are two inefficiencies: The level of transportation is non-optimal, and it is produced inefficiently, using partially loaded airplanes. An appropriate toll on airlines can do much to correct both of these inefficiencies, and is always superior to the best toll on passengers. (See also P-4134.) 23 pp.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.