An exploration of the diverse commitments under which a diplomat functions when representing states and international organizations, great powers and revisionist regions, complex governments or more than one government at a time. A study in comparative diplomacy, the essay describes situations with maximal congruity of loyalties. In the "suspect" diplomat of Facist, Nazi, and Soviet style, governmental restraint sharpens the agent's conflict between national and transnational interests. In America such restraint becomes loyalty screening. The backgrounds of double agents Penkovsky, Sorge, Ozaki, and Philby reveal conflicting loyalties. The tensions of the diplomat increase when functioning in a multiple national diplomacy, among unequal power alliances, and as a viceroy, representing a great power in a collectivity dominated by that power. 28 pp. (SM)
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