The Effects of a Simple Rent Control Scheme in a Competitive Housing Market.

Edgar O. Olsen

ResearchPublished 1969

The purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of Muth's theory of the housing market imply that a simple rent control program results in a decrease in the quantity of housing service consumed in the long run. In the short run, rent control hastens deterioration of rent controlled housing, and, hence, worsens the housing occupied by the tenants of these dwellings. It is further deduced that rent control subsidizes the consumption of nonhousing goods by tenants of rent controlled units at the expense of the owners of these units. In the long run, rent control does not affect the consumption of any good by anybody because all units would, in time, become uncontrolled and we would return to the situation prior to rent control. Finally, it is demonstrated that under conditions of price stability the value of rent control to the tenant declines as time passes.

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  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 1969
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 12
  • Paperback Price: $20.00
  • Document Number: P-4257

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RAND Style Manual
Olsen, Edgar O., The Effects of a Simple Rent Control Scheme in a Competitive Housing Market. RAND Corporation, P-4257, 1969. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4257.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Olsen, Edgar O., The Effects of a Simple Rent Control Scheme in a Competitive Housing Market. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1969. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4257.html. Also available in print form.
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