Several versions of the negotiation of the parameters of incentive contracts between a government and private contractors are formulated as game theoretical models. This framework permits one focus upon a number of aspects that have previously been overlooked such as the interaction of the participants, the lack of domination by one side or the other, constraints upon the player's strategies, and the possible joint interests of the one party in the other player's outcome. Computational methods of solution are suggested. 21 pp. Ref.
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