Queueing Theoretic Analysis of Contractors' Sequential Bidding Problems--II.

by L. H. Zachs

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Second part of an investigation of the bidding and allocation problems of a contractor with fixed resources who produces under time-incentive contracts. Using the "first come, first serve" allocation procedure developed in the contractor model in the first part of the study (P-4412/1), it was shown that the optimal bid the contractor could make on a new contract depended only on the number of customers waiting to be served when the request for proposal arrived. This paper describes conditions under which the optimal allocation procedure will be "first come, first serve." Discussion includes an extension of the contractor model that allows contracts to progress through various levels of quality before they are completed. 27 pp. Ref.

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