Queueing Theoretic Analysis of Contractors' Sequential Bidding Problems--II.
Purchase Print Copy
|Add to Cart||Paperback27 pages||$20.00||$16.00 20% Web Discount|
Second part of an investigation of the bidding and allocation problems of a contractor with fixed resources who produces under time-incentive contracts. Using the "first come, first serve" allocation procedure developed in the contractor model in the first part of the study (P-4412/1), it was shown that the optimal bid the contractor could make on a new contract depended only on the number of customers waiting to be served when the request for proposal arrived. This paper describes conditions under which the optimal allocation procedure will be "first come, first serve." Discussion includes an extension of the contractor model that allows contracts to progress through various levels of quality before they are completed. 27 pp. Ref.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.