The 1967-1970 Vietnam pacification program is described in terms of management, style, size, and program emphasis. Compared with previous programs, this pacification program is more comprehensive and requires greater effort. Unified management pulled together a variety of subprograms and for the first time carried them out on a countrywide scale. Although the new program is not without flaws and weaknesses, it has contributed materially to at least an immediate improvement in the GVN's ability to cope with rural insurgency. Distinctive features include an AID-supported hamlet school and teacher training program, improved rural hospital facilities, and a massive increase of resource inputs. Programs were staffed and run primarily by Vietnamese from the outset, although extensively subsidized and logistically supported by the United States.
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