During its first year in office the Brandt government showed more daring in foreign than in domestic policy, somewhat in contrast to the priorities it had proclaimed at the start. It strove to draw the USSR, Poland, and East Germany into more cooperative relations, while stressing its faithfulness to Atlantic and West European bonds. Although a nonaggression pact with Moscow was the main result of these efforts, the reassurances offered to the West did not dispel fears in Germany and abroad that in its eagerness for "reconciliation with the East" Bonn might in effect enlarge Moscow's influence in Europe. Moscow and East Berlin treated Bonn's signing as a step toward the acceptance of their claims in the area of Germany, but showed little readiness to accept in return the Western claims to Berlin and to free communication with the 17 million Germans under Communist rule. 10 pp.
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