Budgets in a Decentralized Organization with Incomplete Information.
Expert InsightsPublished 1970
The problem of incentives in a decentralized organization where there is lack of information is discussed. The difficulty of designing incentive systems is stressed and a simple example to illustrate some of the problems is outlined. The treatment of the central agency and the decentralized departments is an [n]-person game. 26 pp. Ref.
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1970
- Pages: 26
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: P-4514
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