Budgets in a Decentralized Organization with Incomplete Information.

by Martin Shubik

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The problem of incentives in a decentralized organization where there is lack of information is discussed. The difficulty of designing incentive systems is stressed and a simple example to illustrate some of the problems is outlined. The treatment of the central agency and the decentralized departments is an [n]-person game. 26 pp. Ref.

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