A technique by which the costs and benefits of hardening systems against nuclear threats can be examined together with alternatives to such hardness, taking into account the threat and the system environment. Other means of aiding the system's functional survival that may be more cost-effective include decoys, redundancy, camouflage, inaccessibility, maneuverability, area defense, and hard point defense. A "survivable" system is one that survives long enough to fulfill its assigned role. The technique manipulates a great many complicated known system properties and other variables to obtain optimal design criteria. 9 pp.
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