NATO Military Policy

The Constraints Imposed by an Inappropriate Military Structure

Steven L. Canby

ResearchPublished 1972

Discussion of the thesis that the NATO force, particularly its U.S. component, is inappropriately structured and unnecessarily expensive. Though NATO's declaratory objectives stress defense and deterrence, its force structure is attuned to offense and protracted war. Remedies include: (1) concentrating conventional defense preparations in the critical center region, (2) accepting the greater likelihood of a short war as a basic operating assumption, (3) restructuring the force to emphasize defense (more antitank weapons, prepositioned supplies) and short-term war-fighting capability (more use of local logistical resources), and (4) changing the current practice of replacing wartime losses with individuals to a policy of unit replacement. Besides making the force more appropriate to its mission, the proposed measures would substantially reduce costs.

Topics

Document Details

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Canby, Steven L., NATO Military Policy: The Constraints Imposed by an Inappropriate Military Structure, RAND Corporation, P-4783, 1972. As of September 13, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4783.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Canby, Steven L., NATO Military Policy: The Constraints Imposed by an Inappropriate Military Structure. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4783.html.
BibTeX RIS

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.