Discusses the implications of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, with three points of particular interest. (1) Apparent, codified Soviet superiority in strategic forces is an unacceptable basis for U.S. foreign policy. The reality or appearance of Soviet superiority could seriously affect the will of our allies to support U.S. positions and of Third World countries to achieve the self-reliance in conventional defense that is the Nixon Doctrine's primary objective. (2) The withdrawal option is destabilizing. Following the reassuring atmosphere of detente, withdrawal would signify to the world a period of crisis and confrontation between the Superpowers. (3) The trend toward increasing arms controls should continue, but not with "its own mad momentum." Failure to ratify would have some adverse international effects. The symbolic value of the Moscow Agreements dictates that they be ratified and approved and followed up cautiously with further, more comprehensive agreements.
Hoeber, Francis P., SALT I: The Morning After. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4867.html. Also available in print form.
Hoeber, Francis P., SALT I: The Morning After, RAND Corporation, P-4867, 1972. As of November 6, 2023: https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P4867.html