The Cross-National Comparison of Force Postures.
Expert InsightsPublished 1973
Discusses objective and perceived military force capabilities, with many examples. Besides defending against foreign threats, armies can be (1) national unifiers, (2) national accommodators, serving political and economic development, like the post-Civil War U.S. Army, (3) external accommodators with nonenemy nations, blurring differences among allies. With low demand for military services, armies settle for other tasks; with very high demand, they may assume nonmilitary roles to assure their supplies. Rarely do military elites come to power simply because of severe external threat; other factors intervene. Militant and pretentious postures may be politically valuable, e.g., De Gaulle's gains for France. Important variables, such as national feelings about independence and prestige, lie outside of purely military logic. Force postures also reflect interservice rivalries and domestic politics. Forward strategies reflect, among other things, the degree to which civil authorities trust the military and allies trust each other. Perhaps convergence of norms can be expected only among friends under no severe pressures. (Air Force Academy lecture, February 1973.) 27 pp. (MW)
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 1973
- Pages: 27
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: P-5018
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