The Case Against Not Having a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

by S. T. Cohen


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A discussion of the test ban issue and its accommodation to U.S. national security policies and domestic politics. The current Administration is on record as favoring a "comprehensive test ban adequately verified." U.S. policymakers, however, tend to view "adequacy" as a negotiable quantity and "verification" as a process that can be rationalized to suit arms control policy objectives. U.S. national security policies make it easy to show that "adequate verification" is essentially at hand. So far, nuclear arms control negotiations have produced no tangible results toward reducing nuclear stockpiles or the probability of nuclear war. Moreover, there is fair evidence that the Soviets share neither our control aspirations nor our nuclear policies. Yet the United States continues to seek ways to restrict its nuclear stockpile. 13 pp.

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