Much of the recent literature on the theory of games has focused on the contributions of that subject to problems of an economic nature, with attempts to bring together and compare a number of solution concepts relevant to a particular class of economic games. The primary purpose of this paper is to present and elaborate upon some of the game-theoretic solution concepts applicable to [n]-person majority rule games. Among the solution concepts discussed are the core--the set of outcomes that leaves no coalition in a position to improve the payoff of all its members--the epsilon core, the Shapley value, the bargaining set, and the epsilon-bargaining set. The latter is a new solution concept, presented for the first time in this paper, which may be a step in the development of a theory of majority rule games. 34 pp. Bibliog.
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