The Oil Entitlements Program and Its Effects on the Domestic Refining Industry.

Stephen W. Chapel

Expert InsightsPublished 1976

Demonstrates that the entitlements program reduced the perceived marginal costs of individual refiners and thus provided incentive to increase imports of crude oil and increase refinery output. Also demonstrates that if the refinery industry responded to the oil entitlements incentive, then total costs of individual refiners would increase and cause operation at greater than profit maximizing levels. This paper empirically tests and finds support for the hypotheses that refiners increased their output and their use of foreign crude oil, and decreased refined product imports. Implications: (1) Individual refiners did not realize that collective behavior of the industry would eliminate the subsidy. (2) Eliminating the entitlements program will reduce crude oil imports and increase product imports for all products except distillate fuel oil. (3) Removing entitlements will affect the supply from the domestic refinery industry. Therefore, if there are any product markets with an insignificant amount of imports, eliminating entitlements will cause a shift in the supply situation and prices could change some. 9 pp.

Document Details

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Chapel, Stephen W., The Oil Entitlements Program and Its Effects on the Domestic Refining Industry. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1976. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5717.html.
BibTeX RIS

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.