The psychology of escalation: Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-1963

Jack L. Snyder

Expert InsightsPublished 1978

Discusses a number of theoretical and historical issues involved in the Sino-Soviet split, and uses a cognitive process model of decisionmaking to explain the Soviets' choice of a strategy for pursuing their interests. The author describes the escalation of the conflict in terms of the interaction of the Soviet and Chinese strategies of "compellence," and explains Soviet strategic choices as the result of Khrushchev's mis-estimates of probable Chinese reactions to coercive tactics. Two factors in the cognitive process model of Khrushchev's behavior are avoidance of psychological stress caused by value tradeoffs, and using simplifying stereotypes and analogies in structuring perception. These mis-perceptions developed into a self-fulfilling prophecy, reinforcing the initial misperceptions on which his strategy was based, and resulted in a dynamic escalation process leading to the split.

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1978
  • Pages: 92
  • Document Number: P-6191

Citation

Chicago Manual of Style

Snyder, Jack L., The psychology of escalation: Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-1963. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1978. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6191.html.
BibTeX RIS

This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.