A study of the national security bureaucracies that have formulated policy and handled preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) through four succeeding presidential administrations. The paper describes the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford bureaucracies, but because of topical interest, focuses on changes in the policymaking apparatus since President Carter took office in January 1977. The paper also addresses the question of the most efficient mix of agencies, personnel, and resources for the formulation of SALT policy and suggests that because the policy problems associated with SALT are so varied in nature, solutions should be sought at different levels, using both ad hoc and formal methods.
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