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A preliminary discussion of the ramifications for intelligence of what appears from the Soviet literature to be a preferred Soviet combat operation. Major differences in doctrine at division level and above will probably produce recognizable patterns of activity from which can be deduced the kinds of operations an army intends to use under various circumstances. Doctrinal patterns are apparent in the military literature and in the practice of doctrine as exhibited by troops in the field. Upon recognition of patterns of operational preferences, how can the U.S. capitalize on that knowledge? Related questions that should be raised are posed. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of intelligence lag.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

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