A perspective on how Soviet arms control strategies should be understood, with emphasis on the important differences between the Soviet approach and that pursued by the United States. The paper examines the role assigned to arms control in the overall Soviet concept of national security, reviews specific examples suggested by the apparent linkage between Soviet ICBM modernization programs and SALT negotiating positions, and highlights those features of the Soviet SALT policymaking context that most clearly illustrate the close integration of arms control and force planning in Soviet defense deliberations.
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