The defense of Germany and the German defense contribution
ResearchPublished 1981
ResearchPublished 1981
Identifies the central shortcomings of the German defense contribution as its resting on the notion of limited responsibility of the Germans for the defense of their country and the conjoined German notion that the contribution buys security from the United States. By condoning these notions, the United States permits the development of deep misunderstandings between the two countries, a continuation of absurd NATO arrangements, and a waste of both German and American defense resources.
This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.