Mutual recognition of human fallibility: a resolution of prisoners' dilemma

by Jonathan Cave

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback21 pages $20.00 $16.00 20% Web Discount

In this paper, the concept of sequential elimination of dominated strategies is interpreted as mutual recognition of human fallibility. It is compared to trembling hand perfect equilibrium, and applied to a limited memory supergame of prisoners' dilemma. When players are allowed to respond to their opponent's previous move, the unique result is cooperation. In general, this unrelenting noncooperative behavior of the one-shot game is ruled out.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.