Cover: Mutual recognition of human fallibility: a resolution of prisoners' dilemma

Mutual recognition of human fallibility: a resolution of prisoners' dilemma

Published 1984

by Jonathan Cave

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In this paper, the concept of sequential elimination of dominated strategies is interpreted as mutual recognition of human fallibility. It is compared to trembling hand perfect equilibrium, and applied to a limited memory supergame of prisoners' dilemma. When players are allowed to respond to their opponent's previous move, the unique result is cooperation. In general, this unrelenting noncooperative behavior of the one-shot game is ruled out.

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