Cover: A formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation

A formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation

Published 1984

by Jonathan Cave

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This paper examines a formal model of the way a growing population selects behavior, in a way that permits discussion of the stability of various regimes of behavior (non-cooperative, "tit-for-tat") in terms of population size and behavior. The paper presents the model and definitions and examines the evolution of cooperative behavior for the special case of a static population; combines the dynamics of behavior with those of population growth; and relates its results to results of repeated play where players are rational.

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