The War In Afghanistan

Soviet Strategy and The State of the Resistance

Alex Alexiev

Expert InsightsPublished 1984

This paper was originally presented as a statement to a hearing on Afghanistan held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in Washington, D.C., September 26, 1984. In it, the author discusses three dimensions of the Soviet strategy to defeat resistance and consolidate its rule in Afghanistan: (1) The military dimension's most striking feature is the growing evidence that it may not be designed to secure a purely military solution through a decisive defeat of the resistance forces. (2) The economic dimension, perhaps the most serious threat to the resistance, has resulted in the destruction of a large part of the most productive land. (3) The political dimension has an internal goal of winning over some elements of Afghanistan society, and an external goal of removing the Afghanistan issue from the international political agenda. The author concludes that the effectiveness of the resistance could be improved considerably through streamlining the international aid effort.

Document Details

  • Availability: Web Only
  • Year: 1984
  • Pages: 8
  • Document Number: P-7038

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Alexiev, Alex, The War In Afghanistan: Soviet Strategy and The State of the Resistance. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1984. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7038.html.
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