Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination of Failures and Successes and Their Likely Implications for the Future

by Guy J. Pauker

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 1.8 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

This paper was originally presented at a workshop sponsored by the Regional Strategic Studies Programme of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, in December 1984. It reviews the efforts of governments of various Southeast Asian countries, newly independent following World War II, to counter Communist and/or separatist insurgencies. The leaders of these fragile new governments discovered that democratic processes were at best partial answers against armed insurgencies and had to be buttressed by military and psychological operations and by social and economic incentives. The author suggests that counter-insurgency operations are successful if military activities are blended skillfully, in the short term, with socio-economic policies that give the people hope that the future will be better than the present.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.