Coping with the Unexpected
Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic
ResearchPublished 1985
Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic
ResearchPublished 1985
This paper reviews some of the events of the 1982 war in the Falklands Islands to illustrate the ways the British military modified and adapted its plans and equipment to make do with limited resources in an unforeseen situation. The author suggests that because Western democracies stress the importance of education and independent thinking among their military personnel, they are able to adapt to the unexpected situations that war inevitably presents.
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