In an effort to improve public understanding of the relationship between intelligence and the feasibility of verifying compliance with arms control agreements, this paper provides a primer on the intelligence-gathering process, discusses the need for secrecy, and analyzes 15 potential pitfalls in the process of gathering intelligence. The author suggests that verification is working, as evidenced by the U.S. government's publication of data demonstrating alleged Soviet noncompliance. The fundamental problem is that our political processes have yet to yield a credible means of responding to violations.
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