On the Army Style in Analysis
Expert InsightsPublished 1986
Expert InsightsPublished 1986
In this paper, which was originally presented at the banquet for the Twenty-Fifth Annual U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium on October 8, 1986, at Fort Lee, Virginia, the author argues that Army style affects the quality and utility of analysis as much as technique does. To bolster his argument, he characterizes the Army style, and compares and contrasts it with Navy and Air Force styles. He suggests that for the future, the Army might consider whether it conducts analysis primarily for the purpose of developing numbers required in the bureaucratic planning process, or to improve its understanding and planning for an uncertain and dangerous future.
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