In this paper, which was originally presented at the banquet for the Twenty-Fifth Annual U.S. Army Operations Research Symposium on October 8, 1986, at Fort Lee, Virginia, the author argues that Army style affects the quality and utility of analysis as much as technique does. To bolster his argument, he characterizes the Army style, and compares and contrasts it with Navy and Air Force styles. He suggests that for the future, the Army might consider whether it conducts analysis primarily for the purpose of developing numbers required in the bureaucratic planning process, or to improve its understanding and planning for an uncertain and dangerous future.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.