No Other Law: The French Army and the Doctrine of the Offensive
Expert InsightsPublished 1987
Expert InsightsPublished 1987
This paper discusses the inception, formulation, implementation, and consequences of the doctrine used by the French Army in World War I as an example of what can happen when the best people, with the best intentions, select a doctrine that is completely wrong for the time and the circumstances under which it is to be executed. The author also discusses the political and psychological machinations used to support the doctrine, and how its failure resulted in development of a faulty doctrine for World War II.
This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.