This paper examines the intelligence-based decisionmaking process for applying conventional, tactical firepower. The author is an Air Force intelligence officer who has participated in the process. Among other things, he discusses ambiguous concepts, requirements and goals of various process steps, how the services interact, and the J-STARS program and the lure of technological solutions. His conclusion is that the human element is being neglected, including turnover, renewal of expertise, and narrowness of perception and awareness.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.